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did much to establish was a field so large and so intriguing that he felt the necessity of awaiting further investigation before he could commit himself to a systematic account of it. Thus the lectures embrace much that is old, including the entire framework which he had formulated prior to the new orientation which the thought psychology gave him. But to say this is not to criticize either Külpe or his scrupulous editor. While it is doubtful if Külpe himself would have consented to the publication of his lecture-notes as we find them, we may be thankful nevertheless for their appearance, since even in their uneven state they suggest many important problems and many significant points of view. He who reads them sympathetically will discern a multitude of fine observations that will contribute substantially to any serious attempt to construct a psychology adequate to the demands both of our existing knowledge of the subject and of our ever-widening field of research.

Cornell University

R. M. OGDEN

Suggestion and Autosuggestion. By CHARLES BAUDOUIN. Translated by N. and C. PAUL. New York, Dodd, Mead and Company, 1921. Pp. 349.

Baudouin is a pupil of Coué, who has been carrying on a large clinic at Nancy since 1910. This book is a theoretical exposition of the basis of Coué's practice, which is *autosuggestion*. The chief obstacle to autosuggestion lies in the fact that, under ordinary conditions, the more we try to concentrate our attention on the idea we need, the more attention tends to waver between this idea and opposing ideas. The man who was told that he would find buried treasure if he could dig without once thinking of a certain tabooed phrase had little chance of success. Thus voluntary autosuggestion reverses itself, according to the law which Baudouin has styled that of reversed effort. Autosuggestion must not begin with an effort of 'will', but by a method of relaxation which brings the 'subconscious' into play. One puts oneself into a restful attitude and tries to think of nothing at all. After a time one repeats to oneself the suggestion one wishes to accept. The preliminary relaxation is the essential thing in autosuggestion as in heterosuggestion. The translators, by the way, have translated the difficult word '*recueillement*' rather unhappily as 'collection'. The ordinary translation 'concentration' would have been quite as good, but 'withdrawal' would perhaps be better, since '*se recueillir*' means not a direction outward of the concentrating powers of attention but a gathering of them inward.—What is the advantage of autosuggestion over heterosuggestion? The two evidently are essentially one in nature: every accepted suggestion from without becomes an autosuggestion. But autosuggestion is free from the hampering suggestion that someone else is necessary to the situation, a freedom that certainly is most desirable.

Children, however, are not allowed the precious privilege of autosuggestion. A chapter on their education presents us with the familiar picture (not often, let us hope, realized in life) of the mother bending over the sleeping child and murmuring suggestions into its ears. We teachers, who give suggestions to the young, pacify our consciences by the comforting thought that they will reject what does not naturally belong to them. We can but be thankful that we, ourselves, were allowed to grow up without ever having lost our normal powers of resistance to our parents.

Vassar College

MARGARET FLOY WASHBURN

Elements of Folk Psychology: Outlines of a Psychological History of the Development of Mankind. By WILHELM WUNDT. Authorized translation by E. L. SCHAUB. London, George Allen & Unwin Ltd.; New York, The Macmillan Co. 1921. Pp. xxiii., 532.

It is encouraging, as a sign of the times, that this translation has reached a second printing. The exposition of the *Elemente* is simple;

the book covers an enormous range, and is packed full of ideas; and the general trend of its doctrine is sound. The writing is also singularly fresh; only in the constant recourse to dual division do we note any hint of stereotyping in Wundt's thought. Occasionally, of course, we have a one or a three; but the twos—two reasons, two motives, two factors, two forms, two conditions, two changes, two ideas, two lines of development, two conceptions—confront us on every other page. This tendency is, undoubtedly, much more than a mannerism: one is reminded of the illuminating articles by Karl Groos *über den Aufbau der Systeme* (*Zeits.*, 49 and later),—articles which, to my knowledge, have not yet received the attention they deserve. For the rest, Wundt's style is mature, weighty, assured; and his sentences are interlocked in the characteristic way that makes hard the path of the translator.

The new issue is offered to the public as a 'revised edition', though we are not told where the revision has wrought change or how far it has gone. I do not think that it can have been very thorough. At all events, every single one of the passages that I had marked for correction or query in 1916 remains unchanged in 1921. Even the misprints are left standing. I subjoin (with page-references) a partial list of these passages.

- 32 For *imititate* read *imitate*.
- 38 For *Leues Morgan*, *Ancient Humanity*, 1870 read *Lewis Morgan*, *Ancient Society* (cf. 152), 1877.
- 42 (line 5 from bottom) for *polygamy* read *polygyny*.
- 75 The Sarasins published their book on the Veddahs in 1891, so that Wundt in 1912 should have dated its appearance "about twenty (not ten) years ago." In any case the *ten* should have been corrected in 1921. So the "sixty to seventy years old" of p. 109 should have been changed, or its date (1912) added. The phrase "some two years ago" on p. 258 does not occur in Wundt's text, 1913, 256.
- 79 For *Sea of Bengal* read *Bay of Bengal*.
- 96 The ring-tailed lemur belongs to *Madagascar*; the Malayan *kra* is the *Macacus cynomolgus*.
- 117 (9 lines from bottom) For *particular* read *individual*; cf. the use of *particular* for *bestimmt* on the following page.
- 124 For *cooking* read *boiling*.
- 177 *Boomerang* is either a slip on Wundt's part for *bull-roarer*, or indicates a faulty memory of Spener and Gillen. Churingas of boomerang-shape are altogether exceptional.
- 180 *Aranda* is the German of the English *Arunta*.
- 197 For *casual* read *causal*.
- 198 *Indo-Germanic*, here and elsewhere, should be *Indo-European*.
- 212 For *prepondering* read *preponderating*.
- 218 For *Mycenian*, here and elsewhere, read *Mycenaean*; and for *Mycene* (p. 377) read *Mycenae*.
- 223 (line 16 from bottom) For *he* read *it*.
- 237 The Polynesian child has to live "several hours" to gain its right to existence; on p. 44 the child has to live "but a single hour."
- 242 For *Preusz*, here and elsewhere, read *Preuss*.
- 249 For *Zuni*, here and elsewhere, read *Zuñi*.
- 255 For *Eleusynian* read *Eleusinian*.
- 297 For *Opis* read *Apis*.
- 325 For *testify* read *testifies*.
- 331 For *older members* read *other members*.
- 355 Is it worth while to change our familiar phrase "by the oaks of Mamre" to "near the terebinths?"
- 363 (line 10 from bottom) The punctuation is doubled.
- 417 For "peoples of the Andes" I should prefer "Andean peoples," since the associations of the word *Andes* are to South America.

422 (line 17 from bottom) For *it* read is.

449 (line 12 from bottom) For *heterogeny* read heterogony.

465 For *phallephoric* read phallophoric.

Finally, to conclude this list of little things, I note that 'will' and 'would' continually take the place of 'shall' and 'should.' cf. 68, 96, 114, 151, 192, 227, 241, 258, 267, 331, etc.

There are, however, larger things also to be considered; and of these there are two (as Wundt might say) that have specially impressed me. I suggest, first, that it would be well to give the full titles, dates, places of publication and (if these exist) titles and dates of translations, of the books which Wundt mentions casually and characterizes incompletely in the course of his exposition. Wundt's references, which naturally tend to be German, might also be supplemented by a few of our first-rate English books. A selected bibliography would surely be of great aid to the serious student; and if the publishers should object to an extension of the volume, there is a blank page 524 asking to be filled. I suggest, secondly, that in the cases where Wundt trips over a matter of fact—the generalization concerning Australian shields on p. 125 (cf. 299) is a flagrant instance—the translator should try to discover the source of the mistake, and in a footnote should state it and correct it by giving chapter and verse of some more reliable authority. It is impossible that a book of this sort should be errorless, but the errors lie on the surface.

E. B. T.

The Biological Foundations of Belief. By WESLEY RAYMOND WELLS. Boston, Richard C. Badger, 1921. pp. xi., 124.

The author has here brought together five essays, previously published in periodicals, which have as a common theme some aspect of religious belief. The first essay, which points out the "biological utility of religious belief during the course of human experience," gives instances and deductions from history which, if accepted, prove that the human races which have survived owe their survival as well as the institutions of art, industry, science, law and politics to the fact that they possessed some form of religious belief, quite independently of the question whether those beliefs were true or false. The argument leaves us a little uncertain whether belief is the foundation of biology or biology the foundation of belief. Religious belief, we infer, stands as the 'cause' of biological survival, although in a later essay the survival of belief points to its biological basis.

The second essay, which treats of two fallacies, the *pragmatic fallacy* and the *fallacy of false attribution*, is of a higher order and of more concern for the philosophy and psychology of religion. The first of these fallacies is the fallacy of assuming to be true that which carries value or that which works; it is due to the failure to recognize that beliefs which are false may at the same time be of great value. A 'metaphysical' belief, whether true or false, has the same subjective effect or value; if it be a 'scientific' belief and untrue, the objective results will, if one persists in the belief and acts thereon, more than outweigh the subjective, and hence leave a balance on the side of disvalue. No attempt is made to apply in detail this mode of characterizing science.

If the discussion of the *pragmatic fallacy* leads on to questions of the relation of mind and body and perhaps inevitably to an organismic or behavioristic point of view, the *fallacy of false attribution* points to the problem of meaning on the one hand and of adequate stimuli on the other. The meaning which attaches to an experience is neither the experience itself nor the adequate stimulus for the experience, and the attribution of the experience to a supernatural source simply because the experience carries a meaning which points to the supernatural, even in the face of an adequate